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RECENT DECISIONS
offend solely against the majesty of the state to which it owes its
life, or, in other words, constitute public wrongs only, then the courts
of another state can provide no remedy.3 This is on the theory that
the courts of this state should not entertain actions simply to redress
the outraged dignity of foreign governments. 4  If, however, such
illegal acts also cause injury to the property rights of individual stock-
holders who are citizens of this state, those citizens are entitled to -full
relief, so far as such relief can be accomplished by acting directly o.n
the persons of the defendants. 5 The plaintiff does not sue in his own
right but in the right of the corporation and to redress wrongs not
personal and peculiar to himself, but to the corporation and alike to
all its stockholders. 6 The right of the stockholder to compel a res-
toration by the officers of the corporation is coextensive with the
right of the corporation itself.7 The corporation would not be con-
fined to the courts of the state which created it but could pursue its
officers in whatever jurisdiction it might find them; otherwise, it would
be remediless if these officers remained without the state.8
A contrary rule would be unfortunate at this time, when the
majority of corporate enterprises in this state are carried on under
incorporations effected under the laws of other states.9 Under any
other rule, the directors and officials of a foreign corporation, trans-
acting business and having -its principal office in this state, might
plunder the corporation with impunity and the courts of this state
would be without power to redress such wrongs. 10
J. E. H.
INSURANcE-ExCLUSION OF LIABILITY CLAUSE-VEHICLE AND
TRAFFIC LAW.-Automobile liability insurance was issued in Connec-
ticut, the place in which the insured resided. The policy excluded
liability "while (the automobile is) being driven * * * by any person
in violation of law as to age or under the age of sixteen (16) years
in any event." An accident occurred in New York while the vehicle
was being operated by a driver under the minimum age limit in New
York, although he was over the age of sixteen years and validly li-
Miller v. Quincy, supra note 2; Ernst v. Rutherford and B. S. Gas Co.,
38 App. Div. 388, 56 N. Y. Supp. 403 (2d Dept. 1898).
4Ibid.
Ibid.
Greaves v. Gouge, 69 N. Y. 154 (1877); Alexander v. Donohue, 143 N.
Y. 203, 38 N. E. 263 (1893); BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS 611, 616; CLARK,
CORPORATIONS (3d ed.) 486.
'Miller v. Quincy, supra note 2; Ernst v. Rutherford and B. S. Gas Co.,
supra note 3.
'Ibid.; BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS 861.
'Supra note 3.
"Miller v. Quincy, supra note 2; Ernst v. Rutherford and B. S. Gas Co.,
Fisk v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., both supra note 3.
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censed in Connecticut.1 Held, that the exclusion of liability for the
accident was properly maintained by the insurance company. Weiss
v. Preferred Ins. Co. of N. Y., 241 App. Div. 545, 272 N. Y. Supp.
653 (2d Dept. 1934).
It is undisputed that the words, "violation of law as to age," re-
late to the law as to age at the place of the accident. 2 By virtue of
statute no operator's or chauffeur's license is issuable to any person
under eighteen years of age.3 Unlicensed drivers * * * cannot drive
motor vehicles." 4 The public policy of this state is not to allow one
under eighteen to operate a motor vehicle.5 A person under eighteen
years of age is presumed to be incompetent to operate a motor
vehicle.6
Recognition of the licensees of Connecticut is not obligatory even
under the theory of comity.7 The New York Motor Vehicle Law
recognizes a limited reciprocity ,to the operators of other states; the,
extent of the reciprocity conforms to our theory of public policy as
indicated above. Only those persons "of the age of eighteen years
and upwards," who are non-residents of this state, and are residents
of a state having laws, with which such persons have complied, which
required such persons in order to operate or drive a motor vehicle
on the public highway to be licensed, may operate a motor vehicle
on the public highways of this state without being so licensed under
New York's statutory regulations.8 One validly licensed in another
state, operating a motor vehicle in this state while under the mini-
mum age prescribed for the operators of motor vehicles in this state,
is amenable to our penal law for driving without a license. 9
N.S.
1 Connecticut's age requirement for operators of motor vehicles is sixteen
and upwards. Instant case.2 U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Guenther, 281 U. S. 34, 50 Sup. Ct. 165 (1930).
3 N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (1929) §20, subd. 1.
"Id. subd. 4; Op. ATrORNEY GEN. (1910) 411; Morrison v. Royal Indem-
nity Co. of N. Y., 180 App. Div. 709, 167 N. Y. Supp. 732 (4th Dept. 1917);
Wagoner v. Fidelity Casualty Co. of N. Y., 215 App. Div. 170, 211 N. Y. Supp.
188 (3d Dept. 1926).
' The one exception is the junior operator's license, whose right to drive
is so limited and circumscribed as to be of no import in the instant case. N. Y.
VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (1929) §20.
'La Rose v. Shaughnessy Ins. Co., 197 App. Div. 821, 187 N. Y. Supp.
562 (3d Dept. 1921).
"Comity in the legal sense is neither a matter of absolute obligation on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other. But it is
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard to the inter-
national duty ard convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of the
other persons who are uider the protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U. S. 113 at 163-4, 16 Sup. Ct. 139 (1859). (Italics writer's.)8 N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (1929) §51, subd. 2; Op. ATTORNEY
GEN. 1912) 223.
'See note on N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (1929) §51 at 142 of
booklet, N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, ISSUED BY THE N. Y. STATE
DEPT. OF TAXATION AND FINANCE (1934).
